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When NASA launched its recent series of 
Voyager spacecraft on multi-year journeys to 
the outer planets of our solar system, jour­
neys that will take them beyond our solar 
system to destinations we know not where, the 
space agency included on each Voyager a cap­
sule containing artifacts designed to camn.m­
icate with alien beings. The artifacts were 
designed first to explain our location in the 
Milky Way galaxy, our fhysiogncmy, our cul­
tural institutions and symbols, and certain 
rudiments of a possible mathematical language 
of camn.mication. Presumably, any alien be­
ings that might chance upon these spacecraft 
'NOUld be able to decifher the meaning of the 
contents, and if they are logical, benign, 
and intelligent beings, they will seek to 
comrmmicate with us and relieve us of our 
. sense of· isolation as possibly the only in­
telligent beings in the universe. 
It is almost impossible to imagine what 
the tremendous impact on human history 'NOUld 
be if we were to receive a return manuscript 
in a bottle, so to speak, or sane other 
manifestation of an answer to our hopes and 
inquiries. Humans are not alone in the uni­
verse! There are other intelligent, sentient 
beings in the universe who could, perhaps, 
give us their wisdan and their perspective to 
break through the terrible and seemingly 
insoluble problems that we face. And perhaps 
best of all, we might fin:i sane way to return 
to tlle harnDnious and natural state of living 
that eludes us in our Imlch synthesized world. 
But sane would ask why we nust search 
the far reaches of the universe for a 
consciousness different fran our own, when we 
live on a planet that presents us with a 
~erful multiplicity of life, vibrant with 
species that we know virtually nothing about, 
and fran whose intelligence and adaptive 
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skills we could gratefully learn. We liter­
ally have "alien" life and a presentimmt of 
consciousness right at our feet and all a­
round us in every environment that humankind 
itself has o:::me to live in, and BaDe that are 
as yet uninhabitable for us. Animal life 
fran insects to higher mantnals abounds on our 
planet, though in nearly every respect it is 
threatened by human maladaptation to the 
enviroI1l'OOllt and our lack of mrlerstan:li.ng of 
its fragile interrelationships. 
Until recently there have been pitifully 
few attempts by humans to ccmnunicate with 
and "learn the wisdan of" our fellow beings 
an Earth. But is it possible for us to learn 
the "language" and the true capacities of 
other animals? Do animals have intelligence 
at all? '!he answers to these questions are 
vital to our ability to live an and manage 
this planet. And they are vital to us if we 
are ever really to understand our own capaci­
ties, as well. 
Evolution and Ca1sciousness 
Long before Olarles Darwin developed the 
scientific theory of biological evolution and 
twentieth century astrofhysicists developed a 
theory for the evolution of planets, stars, 
and galaxies, the fhilosofhers of Irxtia p.1t 
forth a concept of evolution that remarkably 
parallels our m:dern scientific theories. 
Stories of creation and evolution found ;in 
the ancient H.iJiiu scriptures, the Upmishads, 
sane three thousand years old, tell of a kind 
of consciousness that pervades all of crea­
tion. '!his consciousness they called "At­
man," which, aware only of itself, began with 
the rrost basic o:xnpourrls, such as rocks and 
minerals, and through a process of successive 
o:mplexity and ccmbination of rrolecules, 
crossed the threshold fran inorganic to 0r­
ganic matter. And again through a process of 
ocxnbination, canplexity, and "karmic" exper­
ience (learning) , which the Hindus called 
"reincarnation" or rebirth after the perish­
ing of the previous temporal fonn, CXJllScious­
ness noved up the ladder of creation fran 
plant, to insect, to vertebrate, and through 
the phyla and classes of vertebrates, finally 
t..o arrive at the cra.ming achievement of 
creation-humanity. Humanity itself is con­
tinually in the process of refinement throuqh 
this sare law of reincarnation. At each 
stage of this progression all that has been 
gathered fran previous stages remains as a 
Part of the newly c:xxrplex being; nothing is 
lost; rather, each new stage accrues new 
material for its life process while keeping 
vestiges of the old. 
When we CXJllSider the miracle of life-­
that is, that raw matter has becane animate 
and sensate through the fifteen billion years 
of the universe' s existence, that the whole 
of our existence has becane so much rrore than 
the sum of our rrolecular Parts-it is not 
hard to feel the profound awe that the an­
cients felt for creation. Looking about them 
and seeing the vast array of plant and animal 
life, each with its own niche and set of 
behaviors, and also seeing that hmnans pos­
sessed many of the traits of other animals, 
the ancients set down their metaphysical rule 
of evolution. we continue to this day to 
grapple with our understanding of all that 
carne to pass. I>bst perplexing of all, at the 
center of this miracle of life lies its 
greatest achievemmt, and, perhaps, its 
greatest problem, as well--consciousness. 
What is it? How does it manifest itself? 
And for our purposes, do animals have it, 
and, if so, how is it different fran our 
hunan CXJllSciousness? 
'lb answer these questions, we must first 
cane up with an operative definition of what 
consciousness is. The definition we use must 
have a satisfactory scientific and phenem:mo­
logical foundation. The problem, of aJUrse, 
is that definitions have varied fran one 
school to another, each defending its own 
narrowly selected criteria. Behaviorists 
deny that there is anything like conscious­
ness ~~. Rather, there are merely stimu­
li that elicit learned responses--the reper­
toire of res~ses having been passed on fran 
generation to generation, changing only as 
enviromnental needs dictate. 
At the other extrema, philosophers \>tho 
have folla.led on the path laid out by Des­
cartes see the mind as sanething that is 
intangible, inaccessible, and, certainly, 
mysterious in its capabilities. All of the 
mind's activities are based on the axis of 
reality--thooght itself. Taken to its ex­
treme, external reality is not even a proven 
fact, and the organism is trapped within the 
walled city of the mind. 
HCMever, in the latter Part of the twen­
tieth century, IlDst philosophers and scien­
tists, inclu:ling those who study artificial 
intelligence (the science of cybernetics) , 
are willing to postulate the existence of 
sane fODll of "consciousness" and are not 
afraid to lex>k for it in the study of animal 
and human behavior and the intricacies of 
neurophysiology. One thing they do agree 
on-the rrore o:mplex the organism, the great­
er its capacity and diversity of nental 
states. 'lhat is, the o:mplexityof mental 
experience and awareness seems to correlate 
directly with the canplexity and structure of 
the brain which sits at the center of the 
body' s neurological system. 
Most scientists would directly link an 
organism's "nental states" to the capacity of 
its brain, and the ratio of its brain size 
to body mass. Another yardstick for measur­
ing awareness is behavior-how an organism's 
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experiences and sensations are processed and 
channeled back into sane fonn of activity. 
Even here, there may be seeming contradic­
tions to the rule correlating brain canplexi­
ty with behavior \>then one canpares the ener­
getic social organization of ants and bees 
with the seeming indolence of a ma:amalian 
tree sloth. Their body structures are radi­
cally different: the insects have scarcely 
any brain at all, while the sloth, though a 
lCMer order maIIIllal, has an incanparably IlOre 
canplex nervous system and brain. These 
widely different animals have, nevertheless, 
many activities in ex:rmron, i.e., they inter­
act with their respective enviromnents, and 
they share qualities of loccm::>tion, foraging, 
sexual reproduction, etc., with other ani­
mals. So, we must ask: What is the signifi­
cance' of the difference in their biology, 
coupled with the similarity of many of their 
activities? 
Charles Darwin laid a foundation for our 
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comparison of species and classes of animals. 
Using the general theme of natural selection 
and differentiation of species derivEd fran a 
corrrcon ancestor, Darwin p:>ints out that there 
are vestigial and rudimentary organs and sys­
tems common to many different taxa: 
The homological construction 
of the whole frame [of the body] in 
the nenbers of the same class is 
intelligible if we admit their 
descent fran a camon progenitor, 
together with their subsequent a­
daptation to diversifiEd condi­
tions. • With respect to de­
velopnent, we can clearly tm<ler­
stand on the principle of varia­
tions supervening at a rather late 
embryonic period, and being inher­
itEd at a corresp:>nding period, hc1w 
it is that the embryos of wonder­
fully different fonns should still 
retain roore or less perfectly, the 
structure of the CCIIIlInIl progenitor. 
In o:rder to tm<lerstand the 
existence of rudimentary organs, we 
have only to suppose that a progen­
itor p:>ssessEd the parts in ques­
tion in a perfect state and that 
under changEd habits of life they 
became greatly rEducEd either fran 
simply disuse or through the natur­
al selection of the individuals 
which were least enCl.UIlberEd by a 
superfluous part.[l] 
Carl sagan, a notEd astroIiJ.ysicist, was 
one of the designers of the capsules in the 
Voyager spacecraft mentionEd above. In his 
book, The Dragons of Ffien, sagan has upjated 
the observations of Darwin with a discussion 
of the genetics of evolutionary developnent: 
The book of life is very rich; a 
typical chroroosanal DNA roolecule in 
a hUflWl is canposEd of about five 
billion pairs of nucieotides. The 
genetic instructions of all other 
taxa [a biological division of 
species, classes, etc., e.g., plant 
vs. animal] on earth are written in 
the same language, with the same 
code book. Indeed. this sharEd 
genetic language is one line of 
evidence that all the organisms on 
Earth are descendEd fran a single 
ancestor, a single instance of the 
origin of life sane four billion 
years ago. (p. 2.3) 
sagan then makes an intriguing analogy. 
The genetic encoding that is carried through 
the DNA in chromosomes can be ccmpared with 
all other fonns of information and broken 
into canponent pieces. Since, as sagan 
p:>ints out, there are four different nucleo­
tides in each DNA roolecule, and in a single 
hUflWl chromosome there are five billion sets 
of nucleotides, we suddenly arrive at the 
fact that there are twenty billion bits of 
information in a single hUflWl chramosame. If 
this were to be comparEd with the binary bits 
of information in a canputer, sagan makes the 
astounding p:>int that a single hUflWl chramo­
some carries the same information as a four 
thousand voltnne library, with each volume 
containing five hundrEd pages and each page 
three hundred words. 
The genetic instructions of the DNA 
molecule, which are randomly mutatEd by envi­
ronmental factors, allow for either success­
ful or unsuccessful adaptation of the organ­
ism to its envirornnent. But as organisms 
became roore canplex and as the IiJ.ysical envi­
ronment becaIre subject to quicker cycles of 
transformation and uIiJ.eaval, as during ice 
ages, the chances for a successful, purely 
genetic transformation to meet the new condi­
tions became roore problematic. For these 
larger, roore O3lI.Plex organisms, sane new 
system of survival and adaptive information 
needEd to be developed, and that, according 
to sagan, was the extragenetic growth and 
specialization of the nervous system. Randan 
genetic transformation of the organism had 
reachEd its practical limits for success (for 
every success, thousands of failures would 
occur) 1 henceforth, information relevant to 
survival and propagation, and the enhancEd 
sensory systems to convey new information, 
would be processEd in the brain. 
The brain as we know it today, with its 
recognizable divisions, had already evolved 
sane five hundrEd million years ago. It 
continued to grow and specialize as life 
fonns changEd fran marine to amphibian to 
reptilian and, finally, to manmalian. At 
each of these stages, species have developed 
which have made optimum use of their brains 
within the taxa limits. The roore intelligent 
of these animals have had larger brains to 
run their bodies. The fact that there is 
excess brain capacity over and above that 
which is needEd for simple biological main­
tenance is often seen as an indication of 
p:>tential intelligence. In roodern times, 
chimpanzees, dolprlns, whales, and hUflWlS 
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have the largest brain size to body mass 
ratios am are at the top of the :marrmalian 
intelligence scale. 
Cile scientist who has worked on identi­
fying the layered growth of animal brains 
over the course of evolution is Paul D. Mac­
lean, head of the Laboratory for Brain Evolu­
tion and Behavior at the National Institute 
of Mental Health. Elaborating on the work of 
James Papez, Maclean has defined and explored 
three different parts of the brains of lOOst 
animal species. In his work, as in lOOst 
other scientific studies, the yardstick for 
measuring brain capabilities is usually the 
human brain. This bas sane obvious drawbacks 
as far as the question of animal conscious­
ness is concerned; for, aIlOng other reasons, 
when they are experimentally mmip.1lated, 
animals cannot "report" their sensations and 
feelings as a hum:m can. Nevertheless, the 
underlying neuroIilysiology shows sane inter­
esting similarities between animals and hu­
mans. 
Maclean has studied. a number of species 
and found that there is an older brain which 
he calls the reptilian ccxnplex, because it 
was the major brain for reptiles. going back 
to the age of the dinosaurs. The midbrain, 
also called the limbic system, surrounds the 
reptilian ccmplex. Finally, the forebrain, 
or neocortex, developed its pr:i.ma.cy after the 
other two and usually sits atop or surrounds 
them. Maclean emphasizes this in the follow­
ing dramatic way: 
Speaking allegorically, we might 
illIagine that when a psychiatrist 
bids the patient lie on the couch, 
he is asking him to stretch out 
alongside a horse and a croco­
dile. [2] 
Since the three divisions of the brain are 
fouOO in all kinds of an:i.ma.ls, fran the lOOst 
primitive to the lOOst ccmplex, we must take a 
nore detailed look at their functions. 
1. '!he Reptilian Brain 
'!he reptilian brain, or hiOO brain, is 
the lOOst basic part of the upper nervous 
system. it is often referred to as the brain 
stem, which feeds directly into the central 
nervous system at its lower ern. It is here 
that the brain begins to process the inp.xt of 
the sensory systems of the body-touch, heat, 
cold, etc. It is here also that the direc­
tions imparted to the lOOtor system (nerves 
that activate the heart, lungs, muscles, and 
other organs) proceed directly into the cen­
tral nervous system. 
'!he "psychological" and behavioral 
states that characterize this part of the 
brain seem to involve ritualistic am hierar­
chical displays, such as the spectra of dani.­
nance-sul:mission, sexual courtship, display, 
mass migration, and ganging up on the weak. 
'I'here is a certain "stolidness," to use sa­
gan I s tenn, about creatures, such as rep­
tiles, that have this as the daninant part of 
their brain. Yet, the efficiency and neces­
sity of this part of the brain in organisms 
is amply attested by the incredibly long 
period that reptiles have lived on Earth. No 
organism, least of all humans, with their 
elaborate, specialized brain, could exist, if 
it were not for the vital functions perfonned 
by this part of the brain. 
2. '!he Limbic System 
'I'he limbic system of the brain, sane­
times called the midbrain, is usually associ­
ated with older or less intelligent marrmals, 
such as horses, marsupials, sloths, etc., 
because it is the chief feature of their 
brains. It, of course, exists in ·sane fonn 
in species fran fish to humans. It is called 
the limbic system because it is associated 
with the functioning of the limbs of the body 
and the refinement of their uses. 
It is a nore .I;XJWerful part of the brain, 
in the sense that a ccmp.lter with nr:>re capa­
city and greater speed is considered nr:>re 
powerful. Psychologically, it afI)ears to be 
the center of strong em:>tions, such as 
rage/fear, pleasure/pain, and rejoicing/sor­
rowing. The limbic system's ablity to affect 
our body with the release of strong endocrine 
chemicals is often reflected in our speech, 
as when we refer to our em:>tions with IiJ.rases 
like "love in our hearts" and "anguish in our 
guts," or when primitive societies locate a 
"dem::m" in the liver, 1xJwels, etc. sane of 
the behaviors which are said· to be controlled 
by this part of the brain are flight/fight, 
tension/relaxation, hunting, hoarding, ag­
gression, bonding, searching, flocking, and 
rejoicing. 
Carl sagan bas noted the following about 
the evolution of the limbic system: 
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There are reasons to think that the 
beginnings of altruistic behavior 
are in the limbic system. Irrleed, 
with rare exceptions (chiefly the 
social insects), manmals and birds 
are the only organisms to devote 
substantial attention to the care 
of their YOlIDg--an evolutionary 
developnent that, through the long 
period of plasticity which it per­
mits, takes advantage of the large 
information processing capability 
of the mamnalian and primate 
brains. Love seans to be the in­
vention of the mamnals. 
sagan i.nmediately qualifies this statement to 
include nan-mamnals with lesser developed 
limbic systems: 
This rule on the relative parental 
concern of mamnals and reptiles is, 
however, by no means without excep­
tion. Nile crocodile IOOthers care­
fUlly put their fresh hatchlings in 
their IlDUthS and carefully carry 
them to the canparative safety of 
the river waters; while 3arengeti 
male lions will, upon newly doni­
nating the pride, destroy all the 
resident cubs.[3] 
To this I 'ItUuld add the poignant wait of the 
IOOther sea turtle, after journeying perhaps 
thousands of miles, at the edge of the surf 
for those of her hatchlings who can wake it 
to the safety of the water on the day after 
they hatch. This scene probably stretches 
back tens of millions of years to the priIOOr­
dial age of the reptile. Still, there can be 
no doubt that the limbic system represents a 
great evolutionary advance toward the broad­
ening of "mental" capability and behavior 
over the IOOre primitive reptilian cx:mplex. 
3. The Neocortex 
The neocortex is the last and IOOSt revo­
lutionary addition to the brain. With the 
neocortex, or forebrain, we IlkJVe fran the 
clearly delineated biological and behavioral 
functions of the reptilian and limbic systans 
to a IOOre subtle and less well-defined set of 
functions and behaviors. Because human 
beings have by far the best developed neocor­
tex, it is not surprising that the preponder­
ance of our data on this part of the brain 
canes fran studies made on human p3.tients who 
have had scme alteration or surgical stimula­
tion of the cortical areas of the brain. 
The subtlety of the functions of the 
neocortex argues not only for its :iJnpJrtance 
to the conscious activity of the human being 
but also brings us to the precise heart of 
our difficulties in assessing the conscious­
ness of animals. AIthough we can observe a 
loss of hearing or sight in an animal, it is 
IOOre difficult to see just what effects other 
manipulations in the cortical areas of ani­
mali; \',Quld have on their flIDctioning.. They 
cannot report to us their sensations, or if 
they have tried to report their sensations, 
we have not learned the language of even one 
species other than our own. It reminds us of 
Bishop Berkeley I s argument that if a tree 
falls in a forest and no one is there to hear 
it fall, does it really wake a sound? This 
will have a bearing on our discussion of 
animal behavior below. 
As we have already noted, the neocortex 
is the IOOst recent evolutionary developnent 
of the neurological system in animals. It 
ranges fran being a very small adjunct to the 
brain in fish and snakes to CCil!POsing nearly 
half the brain in sane mamnals, while in its 
IOOst advanced evolution in humans, it cx:.m­
poses up to 70% of all neurons in the central 
nervous system. 
Structurally in humans, the neocortex 
has a number of interesting divisions, the 
IOOst :iJnpJrtant being a left/right hernisJ;here 
split. The left hernisJ;here, once thought to 
be the daninant half of the brain, because, 
anong other things, it OJIltrols right-handed­
ness in humans, is apparently the_ side that 
controls linguistic and mathematical ability. 
However, in rrost well-developed brains with 
an excess cap3.city beyond simple biological 
maintenance, there is OJIlsiderable redundan­
cy, with backup areas of the brain capable of 
picking up sane functions lost when damage 
occurs to other parts of the brain. The 
right side of the neocortex is devoted to the 
aptitude for IlDJSic, identification of visual 
p3.tterns and the expression and reoognibon 
of enntians. 'lbese are thought to be €!lOC)"­
bans that are developed in the various lim­
bic parts of the brain but are recognized and 
expressed by the necessary help of the right 
side of the neocortex. 
Norman Geschw:ind, writing in SCientific 
American, notes that we know of "haoologous 
areas that are found in all species that have 
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a well-developed cerebral cortex."[4] Pre­
sumably, other species with less well-<ievel­
oped cortices could have other areas of their 
brains that are used for similar functions. 
Geschwind notes the results of experiments on 
rhesus nnnkeys who had occipital lobes exper­
imentally manipulated, which had a direct 
effect on the nnnkeys' ability to recognize 
faces. 'lbe nnnkeys were shown fhotDgraphs of 
other nnnkeys and could readily identify 
them, but they lost this ability when areas 
of the occipital lobes were cut. 'Ibis abili­
ty to recngnize individuals is a "valuable 
talent in a highly social animal and there 
has probably been strong selective pressure 
to improve its efficiency.n[S] Another re­
markable example of an animal' s ability to 
select stirmlli and recognize a specific fea­
ture· is that of the tern, a sea bird. 'lbe 
IlDther leaves her chick in the bird colony of 
tens of thousands of birds to catch fish, and 
upon her return, she can recognize the exact 
squawk of her chick out of the deafening 
cacoJ;hony of thousands of chicks and adults 
in the colony. 
Behaviorists and ethologists who share 
their views would argue that this is not an 
example of consciousness. It is, supposedly, 
a simple sti.rmJlus and response. But since 
they deny consciousness to humans as well, 
for the purposes of this paper, we can brac­
ket this };hilosoJ;hical question and assert 
that what is significant is that animals as 
diverse as terns and rhesus nonkeys exhibit 
qualities of attentiveness and behavior that 
closely resemble those of humans and in many 
instances nay have rrore acute senses than we 
do. 'lbere can be no doubt that the human 
neocortex is not only larger in its mass to 
body weight ratio than other animals but is 
also IlDre anatanically canplex. Still, there 
does not appear to be a clear-cut division 
between Hem:> sapiens and the rest of the 
animal kingdan (especially higher order ani­
nals) with regard to the capabilities of the 
nervous system. Rather, it is a question of 
the greater number of skills and responses as 
well as a question of their a:mplexity and 
abstraction that seems to set animals apart 
fran humans. It is the way that humans can, 
on a very subtle level, canbine features of 
consciousness by creatively associating ima­
ges and meIlDries to fom entirely new sets of 
thoughts that is missing in animals who must 
adapt to a narrower set of environmental 
factors. After all, the human species, un­
like any other animal, can adapt to habitats 
as diverse as the Kalihari desert and the ice 
flows of the Arctic. 
4. Artificial Intelligence 
Whether it is a measure of human soli{r 
sism or whether it is sane brave new fonn of 
Pranethean endeavor, ~ sapiens is the only 
species to attempt to duplicate its own in­
telligence. We have, indeed, gone beyond 
mere storage and retrieval of our extrasana­
tic infonnation (books, libraries, tapes, 
films, etc. ) when we attempt to create our 
own thinking machines. The very recent and 
still fonning convergence of llDdern };hilo­
soJ;hy of the mind, neuroJ;hysiology, and the 
science of cybernetics has focused the debate 
over intelligence on the search for artifi­
cial intelligence. If it is. possible to 
reduce consciousness and intelligence to an 
electrical""1lIeChani.cal set of programs and 
equations that would rival the working of the 
brain, we could do away forever with carte­
sian dualism and simply work on a greater 
and greater aggregate of infonnation proces­
sing. We could then nnve through the scale 
of J;hylo-intelligence until we arrived at the 
duplication of human intelligence. We could 
"reconcile synapses with souls. II James 
Gleick asks, "can machines be taught the most 
human of human traits-creativity, inspira­
tion, imagination?n[6] 
Gleick's article focuses on the work of 
Douglas Hofstadter, author of Godel, Escher, 
Bach, in his efforts to recreate the subtle­
ties of the human thought process. The key 
ingredients, according to Hofstadter, are: 
Perception. Mem::>ry. Analogy. Re­
grouping. Abilities to do 
very simple things, to take things 
apart and put them back together 
again in new ways, {are] so much at 
the root of creativity. when a 
canposer like Bach canposed fugues, 
you can practically see the wheels 
churning. You can see Bach taking 
things apart and putting them back 
together-you can see that incredi­
ble fluidity.n[?] 
Hofstadter's \OiOrk is controversial, because 
every cybernetic scientist would admit that 
an intuitive, surprising, and often irration­
al human being could hopelessly outflank. even 
the II¥JSt formidable ccmpxter, as depicted in 
Arthur C. Clarke' s n2001--A Space OOyssey. n 
It is a question of the perception, meIlDry, 
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analogy, and regrouping abilities of the 
brain that seemingly could never be dupli­
catedl although, according to Gleick, there 
has been much progress m3de toward JlI?lk.ing the 
canpIter a IlPre subtie instrument. Hofstad­
ter does not use the typical problem-solving 
approach which asks the grand question and 
then works through·processes until the minu­
tiae are solved. Rather, Hofstadter starts 
with the minutiae, that asp:ct of the Problem 
which has only the IlPSt Peri];heral CXJIUlection 
with the larger Problem he is solving, and by 
canbining, associating, and regrouping the 
data, he attempts to arrive at a process that 
reseobles the workings of the human mind. 
But it is also clear that animals share 
these same abilities of Perception, IIIe1rory, 
analogy, and regrouping. Hofstadter and his 
colleagues would do well to take a closer 
look at the abilities of animals before they 
tackle human intelligence. Gleick quotes 
Professor Marvin Minsky of M.I.T., who is 
both a supporter and a critic of Hofstadter' s 
work: 
Nobody's ever tried to make a ma­
chine that could build a bird' s 
nest. Instead they're all out 
there in the factories asseobling 
IlPtors. People say, oh yes, the 
bird gets straws and sticks them in 
a nest and glues them in. But a 
IlPtor is designed to be put toge­
ther. The debris lying around on 
the forest floor ian't designed to 
be made into nests. [8] 
'!hus, the ability of a bird to take 
things that have CXJIUlection to one another 
and rem:>ve and reassemble them into a struc­
ture that has coherence and function is sane­
thing that no machine has been able to a­
chieve. The processes are creative and sub­
tie. '!he African lowland gorilla, likewise, 
will build a new nest in the trees everyday 
out of forest matter while on his foraging 
rounds in the jungle. And an otter will grab 
a rock off the sea floor to break open an 
abalone shell, so that he may ccmnence his 
feast. 
Animal Consciousness 
If there are similar, harologous struc­
tures in evolutionary developnent and neuro­
logical functioning could we not postulate 
similarities in "mental states" based on 
explicable behavior patterns? Donald R. 
Griffin, in his book The Question of Animal 
Awareness, provides us with an admittedly 
"unso];histicated but useful set of working 
definitions for states of awareness:" 
Mental Awareness: every normal 
Person thinks about objects and 
events that are rem:>te in time and 
space fran the i.Imled.iate flux of 
sensations. 
Awareness: is the whole set of 
interrelated mental images of the 
flow of events1 they may be close 
at hand in time and space like a 
toothache or raoote as in an astro­
ncmer's concept of stellar evolu­
tion. 
An Intention: involves mental i­
mages of events in which the in­
tender pictures himself as a parti­
ciPant and makes a choice as to 
which image he will bring to reali­
ty.[9] 
Combining these features, Griffin then 
formulates a working definition: "'!he pre­
sence of mental images and their use by an 
animal to regulate its behavior Provide a 
pragmatic definition of consciousness." [lO] 
Mental experiences involve not just the im­
mediate flow of sensations to the brain's 
sensory canplex but also their filtering 
through the lens of IIIe1rory and association. 
As a result, mental images IIPVe fran the 
passive realm to the active when an organism 
denonstrates intentionality. Intentionality 
here is seen in both its P1enanenological 
sense-that of an organism's consciousness 
apprehending the external world-and also in 
the sense that an organism "intends" actions 
that Project into the future. To illustrate 
a rapid fire process of mental experiences 
and intentionality, we will take the example 
of a fox chasing a rabbit. '!he fox senses 
that the rabbit is real and is food. As it 
IlPVes over the terrain, the fox must intend 
to act en its environment by leaping boul­
ders, changing course, and, perhaps, by anti­
cipating the IlPVeltleI1ts of its prey. The raw 
sensory data (mental experiences) cc.mbine 
with mental images of measurement and IlPtien 
and food, etc., to elicit choices for new 
IlOVelIe1ts which fonn a rapid and continuous 
stream of events. 
In additien to demJIlStrating the process 
of intentionality, which is a fundamental 
characteristic of consciousness, one can also 
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note the presence of other sensations in this 
scenario--hunger for the fox, fear for the 
rabbit, and, possibly, desperation for both 
of them. These animals, by their behavior, 
dennnstrate sensations that we can observe 
and measure (endocrine releases and other 
physiological events). And by the fact that 
humans experience hanologous events and reac­
tions, we can equate the animals' sensations 
to our own sensations of pain, fear, hunger, 
etc. 
Ccmnunication is an important element of 
consciouSness. Two important forms of can­
numication are ccmnuni.cation with the envi­
ronment and ccmnun.ication between members of 
the same species. As an example of the for­
mer, Griffin cites the case of certain spe­
cies of birds who apparently are able to use 
the magnetic alignment of the earth and star 
p3.tterns to aid them in their migrations. He 
also discusses the activities of echolocating 
bats that use echoes to negotiate the canplex 
labyrinths of tmderground caves. Both of 
these examples suggest that these species 
must have a changing awareness of their envi­
rorunent and must redirect their behavior as 
new information becanes available. In the 
case of the echolocating bats, which Griffin 
nicknames "Andrea Doria bats," he cites data 
showing that the bats will meroorize their 
environment and often pay only cursory atten­
tion as they fly through the caves. If new 
objects are put in the cave, the bats will 
often collide with them (hence "Andrea Dor­
ia, II a ship that collided with another one 
despite the presence of radar). This dEm:)Il­
strates that they were flying by I1BOC)ry and 
did not expect the new objects. 
As for the case of animals carmunicating 
with others of their own species or IOOlllbers 
of other species, Griffin cites the impres­
sive \«)Xk of Jane Goodall and the Gardners in 
teaching chiropanzees the rudiments of sign 
language and facial expressions. f.t)st amaz­
ing of all is his discussion of the research 
of Karl von Frisch on honeybee dancing as a 
fonn of ccmnuni.cation. Beginning in 1923 and 
extending for the next five decades, von 
. Frisch stUl'lied the "waggle dances" of honey­
bees. He learned that bees returning to the 
hive fran their foraging afield do a type of 
dance to camnmicate to other bees vital 
information about food sources, their abun­
dance, their direction and distance fran the 
hive, and even information to the effect that 
they may have found a better place for the 
hive to locate in the event of a swarm. Bees 
may forage up to three miles fran the hive, 
and the bee's sense of distance and direction 
as it forages is probably derived fran the 
location of the sun, plus its sense of land­
marks on its journeys. other bees will dance 
and camnmi.cate information about their own 
journeys, and there will be a little canpari­
son shopping before m:>re bees are dispatched 
to the !lOst premising food sources. 
'!hese and other examples of animal beha­
vior are used by Griffin to refute the argu­
ments of linguists, such as Noam Chansky, and 
ethologists, such as Konrad Lorenz, that the 
difference between humans and animals can be 
seen in the former's use of language. Chan­
sky and others postulate sixteen design fea­
tures of human camnmi.cation that differ fran 
those of animals. But upon closer examina­
tion, Griffin suggests, these are widely 
shared by animals, as well, or there is 
no clear evidence that they are actually 
unique to humans. These include vocal-aUl'li­
tory exchange, interchangeability (animals 
can be both transmitters and receivers), 
specialization (energy in the signal is small 
canpared to the effect triggered by it), 
arbitrariness (how rigidly reproduced are the 
signals and their information content), dis­
creteness (hC7;f discrete are the individual 
units of camnmi.cation, i.e., words or syl­
lables versus the single cycle of the honey­
bee waggle dance), etc. 
In every case. the distinction between 
the supposedly unique characteristic of human 
camnmication and the animal camnmication 
blurs and becanes altzost meaningless. Final­
ly, Griffin quotes Alfred North Whitehead: 
The distinction between man and 
animal is in one sense only a dif­
ference in degree. But the extent 
of the degree makes all the differ­
ence. The Rubicon has been cros­
sed. [11] 
'!hat is, animals share all or IOOSt of the 
distinguishing characteristics of human lan­
guage and camnmication which are the marks 
of consciousness. '!he main difference seems 
to be the quantitative degree and breadth of 
human language which is what really distin­
guishes our species fran others. Yet there 
can be no doubt that the sum of these quanti­
tative differences leaves a great gulf be­
tween humans and lIDst other animal species. 
'!he intriguing exception to this rule may be 
dolpuns and whales, who have brain size to 
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body mass ratios canparable to our own. Dr. 
John Lilly has pioneered in the study of the 
intricate language patterns of many of these 
species, especially the bottle nose dolphins. 
He remains convinced that they are every bit 
as intelligent as humans, an:! considerably 
rrore benign, as well. 
Conclusion 
'lbe work of behaviorists, linguists, an:! 
ethologists has failed to define any quality 
that humans possess that is not also pos­
sessed to some degree in other animals, es­
pecially the higher mamnals. 'lbe subtle bias 
of these scientists has been to reduce the 
status of humans to the level of other ani­
mals which are seen as mere stimulus/response 
machines. But Donald Griffin argues, and the 
data can certainly support the idea, that we 
should, instead, see animals as beings that 
are Imlch rrore kindred to ourselves. To para­
phrase Whitehead, our abilities seem to be 
those of degree and not of kirrl. We have 
Imlch rrore in camon with animals than our 
previous chauvinistic history would reflect. 
If this is true, then we have the res­
ponsibility an:! the duty to seek to tmder­
stand an:! sanel'1ow o:mnuni.cate with our neigh­
bor species on this planet. The stewardship 
of life on this planet (the ability to regu­
late or destroy) has certainly devolved to 
us. And one need not look far to see that we 
have handled it p:x>rly. Other species are 
declining and becoming extinct at an acceler­
ating pace. OUr treatment of other animals 
even when we study them borders on the crimi­
nally insensitive, as reflected in the grow­
ing scandal of the mistreatment of laboratory 
animals. 
Charles Darwin, the great roodern 
scientist who first broke grotmd in explain­
ing our connection with other animals, paint­
ed a very poignant picture of our insensiti­
vity. He describes the sentience and loyalty 
of a dog whose master was a biologist per­
forming vivisection on it: 
['!he dog] licked the hand of the 
operator [until it fell uncon­
scious]; this man, unless the oper­
ation was fully justified by the 
increase of our knowledge, or un­
less he had a heart of stone, Im.lst 
have felt reroorse to the last hour 
of his life. [12] 
Qle can only wonder if, upon the arrival 
of Sagan's sought after extraterrestrials, 
whether we as humans would be so overlooked 
and disregarded. WOuld they be as insensi­
tive? can we learn this lesson nCltf? 
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